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This paper presents an outcome-based payment scheme to reward ecological services in 
agriculture with the focus on the use of auctions. Starting in January 2004 the payment 
scheme is tested upon its implementation as an agri-environmental program. The intention 
of the program is to overcome the disadvantages of existing and mostly action-orientated 
agri-environmental programs. The design of the payment scheme is based on fundamental 
criteria of market economy such as supply and demand and integrates auctions as an award 
procedure. Furthermore it is outcome-based and considers the interests of the local people 
and the relevant stakeholders and their demand for botanical diversity. During the first 
auction and two surveys of local farmers it is already obvious that this payment scheme is 
not just a theoretical construct but that it is already practicable in the model-region. The 
main research is the determination and the evaluation of the farmer’s transaction costs to 
take part in auctions bound in this regional payment scheme.  
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1.1. Fundamental disadvantages of the current agri-environmental policy  
Agriculture plays an important role in protecting the botanical diversity of the rural 
environment. Since the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, agri-
environmental schemes have been supported by the EU within the framework of the 
second pillar of the CAP. In these programs farmers were rewarded for environmental 
services. In the context of the current agri-environmental policy, ecological services 
provided by agriculture are predominantly rewarded action-orientated and imply particular 
disadvantages both from an ecologics and from an economics point of view (Kleijn and 
Sutherland, 2003; Wilhelm, 1999). On one hand it implicates substantial regimentations for 
farmers, so there are no purposeful incentives connected for an innovative and regional 
differentiated reach of socially desired ecological goals. On the other hand an action-
oriented agri-environmental policy with the use of an uniform premium – especially 
against the background of the necessary examination of agricultural subsidies – faces an 
economic justification problem. This rightfully, since from the current agri-environmental 
policy no incentives proceed to an efficient use of limited public funds. Furthermore it is 
necessary to compare this payment scheme with existing agri-environmental programs. 
Therefore the farmer’s transaction costs to take part in auctions bound in this payment 
scheme will be ascertained and compared with the farmer’s transaction costs of taking part 
in existing agri-environmental programs in a model-region.  
 
1.2. Goals of the payment scheme 
For the solution of the initially described problems and thus for the advancement and 
improvement of agri-environmental programs, an outcome-based payment scheme to 
reward ecological services in agriculture was developed.
1 This payment scheme differs 
fundamentally from the status quo of agri-environmental programs. It is outcome-based, 
integrates market-similar elements by the use of auctions and is regional embodied with 
consideration of the EU-principle of subsidiarity. Furthermore it delivers the possibility to 
                                                            
1 The project is a part of the BIOPLEX-programme. BIOPLEX is an interdisciplinary project investigating 
the links between biodiversity and spatial complexity in agricultural landscapes at different spatial scales 
[see: http://www.uni-giessen.de/bioplex/]. BIOPLEX is part of the BIOLOG-programme funded by the 
German BMBF (Federal Ministry of Education and Science). Aim of the programme is to promote research 
in the context of global change and decreasing biodiversity. BIOPLEX is a collaborative project bringing 
together working groups from Justus Liebig University Giessen and from Georg-August-University 
Göttingen.  
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implicate the participation of the local population’s preferences for botanical diversity. 
From an economics point of view the payment scheme puts a special focus on an efficient 
achievement of ecological objectives, which are defined as ecological goods (Fischer et al., 
2003). In this paper the concept and its components will be described and beyond that, the 
results of the first auction and two surveys with the focus on the farmer’s transaction costs 
in the model-region will be presented. Finally conclusions will be drawn as far as possible 
at that time.  
 
 
2. Transaction Costs 
First a brief overview of the development of the transaction cost economics and their 
theoretical foundation will given. Since Adam Smith economists have been inspired by the 
idea, that the price mechanism is able to coordinate the division of labour and trade in a 
society like an “invisible hand” (Smith, 1776). Almost two centuries later economics did 
begin to realise, that the working of the price mechanism is costly and that something like 
transaction costs do exist. In 1937 Ronald Coase started to introduce first conceptual 
thoughts about transaction costs in his paper “The Nature of the Firm” and build up the 
historical starting point of the transaction costs economics. He argued that firms should be 
conceived as entities endogenous to the economic system and whose existence is justified 
only in the presence of transaction costs to production. Firms and other economic 
organisations and institutions, in effects, exist because agents find it an useful manner of 
minimising transaction costs. But he failed to give a more detailed definition of transaction 
costs and called them simply “the costs of using the price mechanism”. The second famous 
work of Ronald Coase to be mentioned in this context is of course “The Problem of Social 
Costs” (1960). Coase discusses solutions of the problem of negative externalises. Contrary 
to Pigou’s theory that only governments can "internalise" externalities in economic 
exchange or production by means of taxes and subsidies (Pigou, 1932), Coase argued that 
when one considers opportunity costs in its full meaning, no such devices are necessary, 
because in the absence of transaction costs, the allocation of resources is independent of 
the distribution of property rights. This connection between transaction costs and property 
rights became famous as the “Coase Theorem”, although Coase never used that term. 
 
Oliver E. Williamson picked up Coase’s ideas in early 1970s and started the second body 
of work on transaction cost economics (e.g. Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985, 1996, 2000). In  
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his work “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations” 
(Williamson, 1979) he identified the critical dimensions of characterising a transaction and 
links these to the institutional governance structures of transactions. The three principal 
dimensions to describe a transaction are, the frequency of exchange, uncertainty and the 
degree to which investments are transaction-specific. Finally Williamson concludes that 
non-specific transactions are efficiently organised by markets, while recurrent transaction-
specific exchanges could be organised more efficiently governed internally. 
 
In Wallis and North’s 1986 article “Measuring the transaction sector in the American 
economy, 1870-1970” the first effort to measure economy-wide transaction costs was 
launched. Wallis and North measured the size of the so called “transaction sector”. They 
divided the whole economy in two parts, the transaction and the transformation or 
production sector and measured the total value of resources used in the transaction sector. 
In this analyse only the transaction costs floating through the market were captured. But 
the so called non-market transaction costs, such as spending time in waiting, filling out 
forms, gathering information and so on are critically important to analyse and understand 
the economy. Research on non-market transaction costs has been accomplished for 
example by Dagino and Farina (1999), de Soto (1989) or Alexandra and Lee Benham 
(1998).  
 
Finally the very diverse group of economists dealing with transaction costs in Ecological 
and Environmental Economics should be mentioned in this context. Here the transaction 
costs in the working of emission trading and the use of incentive mechanisms in 
environmental protection in general are focused (Solomon, 1999; Tietenberg, 2002). 
 
Especially through the work of Williamson, the transaction cost economics became one, if 
not to say the core field of the New Institutional Economics, so named because it provides 
a theoretical framework and emphasis of testability to the institutional traditions of 
Commons and Veblen. Williamson therefor is considered the founder of this literature, 
both in terms of vocabulary and content and also he is one of the strongest proponents of 
applying the notation of transaction costs. After all, there should be no doubt, that 
transaction costs do exist and do matter. Despite the voluminous literature in the new 
institutional economics, a theoretical consensus on what transaction costs are, is still out of 
sight (e.g. Allen, 1991; Allen, 2000).  
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According to the diverse theoretical understandings and definitions of transaction costs, it 
is not surprising, that also for the empirical measurement of farmer’s transaction costs of 
agri-environmental programs, no unique method has been available yet. So, the main 
questions in the beginning of this research are “What are the relevant transaction costs?” 
and of course “How to measure the transaction costs?”. 
 
Thus in this case the farmer’s transaction costs are focused and will be accomplished by 
using questionnaires to build up an extensive data pool, which finally will be evaluated in a 
transaction costs study. At that time the transaction costs for making an offer in the first 
auction are focused. In the course of the research all farmer’s transaction costs involved in 
taking part in this outcome-based payment scheme – like e.g. the monetary valuated time 
needed to gather information about the auction, to engage an advice, to fill out forms and 




Auctions can be defined as “[ …]  a market institution with an explicit set of rules 
determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from market participants” 
(McAfee and McMillian, 1987). The effectiveness of auctions as an allocation mechanisms 
is theoretical evident and has been well documented in the past. However the use of 
auctions has a longstanding tradition in government procurement contracting, but has been 
limited to trade commodities as for example public works, electricity and emission rights. 
Using auctions to conserve natural resources is a relative new concept. Also in general the 
exploration and the use of auctions to reward farmers as a part of agri-environmental 
programs is increasing, but there is still an urgent need for research, before the 
implementation of auctions especially into the CAP. 
 
Theoretically the potential benefit of auctions in allocating contracts for the provision of 
non-market or public goods in the countryside is analysed by the auction theory. The two 
main reasons why auctions are of interests in this case are the following: First, the traded 
ecological goods are public-type and nonmarket goods which have no standard value and 
in some kind of way a public demand and valuation is needed. The second reason to be 
mentioned is the presence of asymmetric informations between the farmers and the 
administration (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997). Farmers know better how  
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a participation on agri-environmental programs would affect their production and profits. 
So they will calculate based on their individual costs and a price for the trades goods will 
emerge. This offers a possibility for a more efficient use of public funds as if the 
administration would fix a unique premium, not knowing the farmer’s costs of production.  
 
Practically auctions already are used for the provision of nonmarket goods in the 
countryside. Since 1986 the U.S. Department of Agriculture has been awarding land 
retirement contracts for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) based on a competitive 
bidding mechanism. Farmers make offers to obtain CRP cost share assistance, which is 
allocated to them based on a so called Environmental Benefit Index. This Environmental 
Benefit Index incorporates individual scores on six environmental factors, which are 
wildlife, water quality, erosion, enduring benefits, conservation priority areas and air 
quality (e.g. Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988; Plankl, 1999).  
 
In the United Kingdom, embodied in the Conservation Sensitive Stewardship Scheme and 
the Nitrate Sensitive Areas Scheme, a fix payment is offered to the landowners for 
specified environmental actions. The administration then chooses landowners who offer 
the best quality land management plan. In Australia, as another example, auctions are used 
in areas such as salinity control, nutrient control and conservation of existing vegetation 
where land use change is required to achieve environmental improvement (Stoneham et al., 
2002). 
 
Since the early 1990s also in Germany the postulate to use auctions to reward ecological 
services in agriculture became bigger (e.g. Berg et al., 1993; Latacz-Lohmann, 1993; 
Plankl, 1998). Actually even the European Commission starts to allow the use of auctions 
in the context of the furture agri-environmental policy. In article 37 – agri-environmental 
and animal welfare payments – of the “Proposal for a Council Regulation on support for 
rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)” it 
is mentioned that beneficiaries should be selected on the basis of calls for tender and 
criteria of economic efficiency. Also transaction costs find consideration in a way that 
payments may also cover transaction costs. This also shows the necessity and relevance of 
the research presented in this paper. Next the use of auctions to reward ecological services 
embodied in a regional outcome-based payment scheme will be presented. 
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4. The regional payment scheme 
4.1. The components of the payment scheme 
From 2000 to 2003 the outcome-based payment scheme was compiled. In figure 1 the 
payment scheme is drafted and below the substantial components of the concept are 
presented (Fischer et al., 2003; Gerowitt and Marggraf, 2001): 
 
Figure 1: The payment scheme. 
 
Outcome orientation – Ecological goods: Contrary to present agri-environmental programs 
this concept comprises an outcome orientated reward. The farmers will not be rewarded for 
particular actions but for the results of ecological services. These results are defined as 
ecological goods of plant diversity (Bertke et al., 2002). Ecological goods have to be 
clearly defined by transparent floristic criteria, so that farmers are able to prove their 
fulfilment and a justiciable control of the supplied ecological goods can take place as a part 
of the payment scheme. The aims of the production of the so called ecological goods 
“grassland” are the protection of regional endangered plant communities, the preservation 
of grassland on marginal sites and the promotion of species-rich grassland. Therefor the 
number of species per plot and a catalogue of grassland species that are adapted to 
extensive grassland management and characteristic for regional plant communities are 
suitable for the definition of ecological goods grassland. Related to the ecological quality – 
represented by the number of species – three kinds of ecological goods grassland were 
defined. Grassland I represents the lowest and grassland III the highest level of ecological 
goods. An appropriate direct linkage of the remuneration of farmers and ecological results 
leads to a more efficient employment of public means assume as in existing agri-
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environmental programs (Hespelt and Bertke, 2003). The ecological goods grassland are 
achieved, when the criteria of the goods are fulfilled on the total grassland plot. To 
determinate and control these goods, standardised methods will be tested during the 
proving of this payment scheme up to September 2006. 
 
The principle of subsidiarity – The Regional Advisory Board: In the period from 2000 to 
2003 a Regional Advisory Board, witch represents the public demand for ecological goods 
has been assembled. According to the principle of subsidiarity, the Regional Advisory 
Board expresses the demand for ecological goods by deciding aboud the allocation of 
funds for the defined goods. This regional group of experts acts by majority decisions and 
consists of all relevant stakeholders in the model-region, like representatives from the 
Northeim Country Municipal Council, the Department for Construction and Environment, 
the regional office of the State Department of Agriculture, the regional office of the 
Chamber of Agriculture, NGOs, the Farmer’s Union and landowner groups. Based on the 
Regional Advisory Board’s demand, the regional administration invites tenders to make 
offers about the production of ecological goods and accomplishes the bidding procedure. 
In the context of the research project the auction is accomplished by the researchers 
involved in this project. To achieve a further increase of the social acceptance and a – in 
the best way – sustainable implementation of this payment scheme as an institutional 
innovation, apart from expert knowledge also regional population’s preferences will be 
integrated into the decision of the Regional Advisory Board. Therefor a method will be 
developed to enable the continuous determination of the population’s preferences for 
ecological goods in the model-region. These preferences will be presented to the Regional 
Advisory Board and should find consideration in the demand for ecological goods. 
 
Auctions – Efficiency: The use of uniform premiums to pay farmers – as embodied in agri-
environmental programs at present – leads to substantial problems. It achieves only a low 
participation ratio in some regions whereas, in other regions, windfall profits arose. This 
causes an inefficient use of public means (Holm-Mueller et al., 2002). This is the case, 
since with a uniform premium the farmer’s individual cost structure and production 
conditions do not find consideration and all farmers receive a uniform remuneration 
(Plankl, 1999). Auctions therefor leading to individual payments equal to the farmer’s bids 
could be the instrument to solve this problem. In the course of this price calculation it is to 
be expected that the farmers will deliver different offers based on their individual cost  
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structure and relevant production conditions. Therefore the possibility for a higher 
efficiency and a higher ecological use compared to an uniform premium is given. So the 
orders can be assigned market-similarly on the basis of individual calculated offers to the 
most efficient farmers. Moreover the use of auctions comprises financial incentives to 
innovations and a more efficient employment of the factors of production. So farmers try 
to reduce their costs of production and increase the possibility for an acceptance of bids in 
future auctions.  
 
4.2. The proving in the model-region 
To make sure that this regional payment scheme is not just a theoretical construct, but 
could be an institutional innovation as a part of the future agri-environmental policy it 
needs to be tested. In January 2004 the empirical proving started in a model-region – the 
administrative district Northeim in the south of Lower Saxony (Germany). Thereby the 
realisation of the first bidding procedure and the production of the tender documents was 
focused. This was accomplished in close contact with the responsible administration, in 
order to prepare an efficient implementation into the practice. The public proclamation of 
the auction took place on the 1
st of June 2004. Afterwards in a period of six weeks the 
farmers in the model-region could request the tender documents and make their offers. On 
the 10
th of July 2004 the offers were opened and evaluated by the project collaborators. 
Until the 17
th of July 2004 the commitments and denials were sent to the farmers and those 
whose offers were accepted, were contracted to produce ecological goods according to 
they offers. Each farmer had to deliver an individual offer for every plot of grassland. The 
offer includes the choice of the ecological good (grassland I, II or III), the calculation of 
the price per hectare and the exact description of the grassland plot on witch the ecological 
goods exist or will be produced. This shows the specification of an auction. Farmers have 
to calculate in an entrepreneurial way, orientated on their specific ecological production 
conditions, witch leads to differentiated offers. The exclusion criteria in this first auction 
were economic criteria based on the price per hectare and the ecological valuation took 
place by the graduation of the ecological goods grassland I, II or III. The control of the 
offered ecological goods will take place until the 31
st of July 2005 and if the ecological 
goods could be proved the way they were offered, farmers get paid in August 2005. Below 
the most relevant results of the first bidding procedure and first empirical data from two 
surveys in the administrative district Northeim will be presented. 
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5. Results of the first auction 
In the beginning of the first bidding procedure in April 2004, the Regional Advisory Board 
decided about the demand for ecological goods and agreed that ecological goods in 
grassland should be announced in the first auction. These ecological goods were classified 
into grassland I, grassland II and grassland III, whereas grassland III represents the highest 
quality of botanical diversity. 
 
The tender documents were requested by 140 farmers in the model-region. 75 at 
information meetings which took place in the beginning of the bidding procedure in June 
2004 and 65 via telephone or e-mail. In the end 38 farmers with together 199 plots 
delivered offers, which corresponds to a total area of 350,71 hectares. Three offers could 
not find consideration since they had only been received after the offer period. Further 
three offers were rejected, since they exhibited formal defects. Due to a limited budget of 
30.000 € an acceptance of the tender could not be given to all offers. 28 farmers with 
altogether 159 plots received an addition. This corresponds to an area of 288,56 hectares. 
Differentiated by the ecological goods grassland I, II and III the results of the first auction 
are shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Results of the first auction. 
Ecological Goods  Offered Plots  Accepted Plots  Price Area per hectare 
Grassland I  148 (250,99 hectare)  109 (198,25 hectare)  40 - 250 € (∅    98,63 €) 
Grassland II  35 (  61,24 hectare)  32 (  53,33 hectare)  55 - 300 € (∅  175,29 €) 
Grassland III  18 (  36,98 hectare)  18 (  36,98 hectare) 100 - 350 € (∅  202,78 €) 
 
We can see, that for grassland I 148 plots were offered, from which 109 got accepted. This 
corresponds with 198,25 hectares. The range of the advertising prices of all offers for 
grassland I covers 40 to 250 € per hectare. At the ecological goods grassland II from 35 
offered plots 32 were accepted, what corresponds to an area of 53,33 hectares. The range 
of prices comprises 55 to 300 € per hectare. All 18 offered plots with a total area of 36,98 
hectares were accepted at the ecological goods grassland III. The prises for grassland III 
cover 100 to 350 €. The available budget was divided with 54 % to grassland I, 24 % to 
grassland II and 22 % to grassland III.   
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These results show, that in this case the use of auctions in fact leads to very differentiated 
offers and comprises thus a practical potential for a more efficient use of public funds. 
 
 
6. Two surveys of local farmers 
6.1. The first survey 
In the first survey all farmers who requested the tender documents had as well received a 
written questionnaire in a separate envelope. This questionnaire contains questions about 
the attendance or non-attendance at the bidding procedure, about the payment scheme and 
agri-environmental programs in general. Furthermore the farmers were asked to specify the 
time they spend to take part in the auction. This data will be evaluated in a substantial 
study on the transaction costs related with the farmer’s taking part in this payment scheme 
and in comparison with taking part in existing agri-environmental programs. From 35 
farmers participating in the questioning, 30 delivered an offer and 21 farmers operate the 
farm as a sideline. 24 farmers work in a conventional and eleven in an ecological way.  
 
As the aspect which causes most difficulties to the participating farmers, the price-
calculation proves. However in smaller measure than expected, because to 50 % of the 
farmers the price calculation delivered relatively heavily difficulties. The other 50 % 
valued the price calculation as relatively simply. Asked for the reasons why the price 
calculation causes problems, the uniform reason was, that there was no comparison or 
empirical values to be present and that it is the first auction ever in which the farmers in the 
model-region participated. From this it can be concluded that these farmers are not quite 
able to calculate orientated at their own individual cost structures and they still focus on an 
externally given point of reference, similar to an uniform premium. 
 
A further goal is to determine the expenditure of time which is connected with the offer 
generation for the participating farmers. These data is processed in a comprehensive 
transaction cost study, in which the appropriate transaction costs of the farmers will play a 
central role. Some of these results are now introduced briefly. For the procurement of the 
tender documents an average value of 32 minutes was needed. The reading and 
understanding of the tender documents took 39 minutes in average. The calculation of the 
price, including the choice of the ecological goods and the plot takes in the average 90  
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minutes. The immediate filling of the tender documents took 77 minutes at average. So, 
related to this first survey, the whole submittal of offers averages about 238 minutes.  
 
18 farmers had already participated in agri-environmental programs in the past. Compared 
these expenditure of time with the participation in existing agri-environmental programs, 
three farmers evaluate the expenditure of time needed to take part in the auction as much 
higher, three as higher, six as equal, five as lower and one farmer as much lower. In 
another question the farmers where asked to compare the expenditure of time to take part 
in the auction with a general aid request and 32 farmers delivered an answer. One farmer 
evaluates the expenditure of time during the bidding procedure as much higher, four 
estimates it as higher, 17 as equal, nine as lower and one farmer as much lower. Finally I 
would like to deal in the context of this contribution with the evaluation of the use of 
auctions in agri-environmental programs. Three farmers judge the use as very good, ten as 
good, ten as mean, seven as bad and four as very bad.  
 
6.2. The second survey 
In the second survey all 37 farmers
2 who made an offer during the first bidding procedure 
were asked, so the database for a comprehensive transaction cost study can be extended by 
further detailed questions particularly to the expenditure of time of the farmers, possible 
price agreements with others farmers and detailed questions concerning the farmer’s 
transaction costs. The goal is – apart of the determination of transaction costs – to draw 
conclusions on the practical efficiency of auctions in agri-environmental programs 
generally and particularly as a part of this remuneration concept. 
 
In the context of this paper the results concerning the farmer’s transaction costs are focused 
and presented. One main aspect was to value the farmer’s expenditure of time needed to 
participate in the first auction. Therefor the farmers were asked to tell, what they think is 
an adequate remuneration if they would be paid immediate for making an offer and 21 
farmers answered that question. The value differs from 10 to 25 € per hour and leads to an 
average earning of 16,76 € per hour or 0,28 € per minute. Multiplied with the average 
expenditure of time – 238 minutes as ascertained during the first survey – the average 
                                                            
2 In fact 38 farmers made an offer, but in the context of the second survey one farmer could not be 
considered.   
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farmer’s transaction costs of making an offer are about 66,48 € and could be presented as a 
first brief result and benchmark at that time.  
 
Concerning a reduction of transaction costs, in the second auction the use of the internet 
and digital forms will be tested. Asked if farmers would use this way of making an offer, at 
least ten of 24 answered with yes, witch offers another potential to reduce farmer’s and 
administration’s transaction-costs, compared to the first auction. 
 
Behind the context of the regional foundation of this payment scheme it is interesting how 
the farmers think of the fact, that the Regional Advisory Board decides about the demand 
for ecological goods. 24 farmers gave an answer and two farmers think it’s very well that 
the Regional Advisory Board is the only decision-maker in this context. Three farmers 
valuate this as good, twelve as mean, two as bad and five as very bad. This can be 
interpreted in a way, that at that time the farmers do not (yet) think of the Regional 
Advisory Board as a necessary new institution as a part of the administration. It’s obvious, 
that further research is needed to analyse the acceptance of this committee as the special 
regional component of the payment scheme, especially with the focus on it’s sustainable 
implementation into a future agri-environmental policy. 
 
Also these results of the first two surveys speak for a possible successful and efficient 
implementation of most components of this new payment scheme to reward ecological 
services in future agri-environmental programs. So finally the following conclusions can 




The first practical experiences and results during the first auction and the first two surveys 
show, that this outcome-based payment scheme to reward ecological services in agriculture 
is not just a theoretical construct, but that it also works very well in practise.  
 
The results of the first auction show that in fact very differentiated offers were made by the 
farmers in the model-region. This comprises a practical potential for a more efficient use of 
public funds by the use of auctions as with a uniform premium, like it is used in current 
agri-environmental programs. But still more research is needed to analyse the dynamic and  
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development of the prices in the next auction. Thereby it will be interesting to see how the 
price levels will develop and if the price areas will spread or if they even adjust to an in 
fact uniform premium. This will be analysed during the second auction, starting in May 
2005.  
 
Also these first results show, that the expenditure of time needed for farmers to take part in 
the auction are likely not significant higher than in existing agri-environmental programs. 
Furthermore it was the first auction farmers participated and a reduction of corresponding 
transaction costs – caused by e.g. filling out forms, calculating prices or taking part at the 
auction in general – can be expected during next auctions. Seen from a transaction cost 
economics point of view the results of the first survey of farmers show, that auction have a 
high potential to be used as an award procedure and that farmers are able to deal with 
auctions.  
 
To evaluate the components of the regional payment scheme after the first auction 
differentiated impressions emerge. As shown in this paper, the practical use of auction and 
an outcome-orientation – especially combined with auctions – proved to work very well in 
the way it was theoretically intended and received a high acceptance as well as on the part 
of the farmers in the model-region and the integrated regional and supra-regional 
administration. Whereas the component Regional Advisory Board could hardly be 
evaluated in an alike positive way. The main reason is, that even if the first auction took 
place a real sense-making process about the demand for ecological goods wasn’t 
necessary, because of the low available budget of 30.000 €. Determined by this budget and 
the intention to reach as much plots and farmers as possible in was at hand to advertise the 
ecological goods grassland, because they are relative easy and cheep to produce. So still 
the question is unanswered, how an additional institution like the Regional Advisory Board 
could be justified. Especially in consideration of the additional transaction costs connected 
with the implementation and run of an institution like this. 
 
A detailed economic evaluation of the practical interaction of the individual components of 
this decentralised and market-similar remuneration concept will take place in the process 
of the conversion phase. Here it also applies to analyse the practical relevance of the New 
Institutional Economics. Therefor the Transaction Cost Economic and the quantification of 
the project-relevant farmer’s transaction costs are focused. Only by this comprehensive  
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testing it is possible that at the end of the current conversion phase a concept adapted to 
practical conditions for the receipt of the biological diversity can be presented, which is 
legitimised both from an ecologics and an economics point of view. This will be finished 
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